Confronting hegemonies within and fundamentalisms without as a sexual rights activist in Latin America: Challenging Fundamentalisms interview with Alejandra Sardá

JV: What do you understand by the term ‘religious fundamentalisms’? How useful is it in your work, and would you suggest alternatives?

AS: Religious fundamentalisms are political movements using the most conservative aspects of religion to gain and keep political and economic power. They have existed throughout human history as have people with more libertarian views. The unique aspect today is the role of the market. So, more than analysing religious fundamentalisms themselves, it is increasingly urgent that we understand their interaction with the market, because that is what is truly different now. The advantage of the term ‘fundamentalisms’, as with many oversimplifications (like LGBT), is that it can help begin conversations since most people know or think they know its meaning. The problem with it is it emphasises the religious aspect, concealing the agenda for political and economic domination which is a priority for movements presenting themselves as ‘just religious’, but I don’t know if I would use another term. Maybe I would put ‘religious’ in quotes.

JV: Why are issues of women’s rights central to how religious fundamentalisms operate?

AS: Controlling women’s bodies, their sexuality and reproduction is central to social control, whether by religious fundamentalists, nationalists or the neo-liberal market. In the Western imagination, women are linked to desire and whoever controls desire controls the (male) desirer (and the female desirer, whose desire is to be desired). It would be interesting to explore how religious fundamentalisms function in terms of masculinities; I don’t think that ‘only’ the construction of femininities is central to their efforts, so that is important too.

JV: Who are the main religious fundamentalist players in your context?

AS: I use sexual rights as my context, specifically rights affirming the diversity of bodies, practices, identities, expressions and desires in Latin America. The main players are fundamentalist aspects of the Catholic Church, especially its leadership, powerful ‘semi-secular’ groups within it (Opus Dei, Yunque, Knights of Christ, etc.), and Evangelical churches (not the traditional, progressive ones, but neo-Pentecostals).

JV: In your view, how do religious fundamentalisms operate and what has contributed to their effectiveness in recent years?

AS: They operate based on basic human needs: identity, belonging, transcendence, easy and immediate solutions to the most troubling questions. I think if the question were about the neo-liberal market, my answer would be the same. There is something about the defencelessness of human beings vis-à-vis our environment that makes our species so arrogant, so unsatisfied and individualistic, needing to believe our presence in the world has some meaning beyond mere existence, as if existing were not enough of a miracle in itself. So a human being, desperate to emphasise that he is, and is completely unique, easily falls prisoner to the temptation of imagining a god in constant communication with him, a truth that has been revealed to him, his superiority over other beings who exist only to be indoctrinated, condemned, eaten, etc., by him. Advertising and religion talk about ‘from you to you’, enabling each of us to believe s/he is unique. As to their effectiveness, I think religious fundamentalisms have always been effective (e.g., the brutal religious wars in Europe, the genocide of Indigenous people in the Americas, the Spanish Inquisition) precisely because they operate at this basic level of human subjectivity. What has happened recently is that (a) this is the time we live in, so, human vanity makes us see what happens now as completely unique, and (b) due to the global market, we have the ability to learn what is happening almost anywhere at the same time.

JV: What changes do you see in the operation and manifestation of religious fundamentalisms?

AS: The Catholic Church has lost its hegemony over religious fundamentalist thought and action, which was in place since the conquest of the Americas. This began in the 1980s when conservative forces in Rome, led by John Paul II, defeated liberation theology, thereby distancing itself from the masses and leaving a gap that was then filled by neo-Pentecostal churches. In the 1990s in various countries (e.g., Guatemala, Paraguay, Honduras) public figures who were also militant Evangelicals began to appear, in addition to the militant Catholic right that was always active. Also, in Brazil, Evangelical churches began to form political parties and be active in traditional politics in the 1990s. These are all key factors in my work, because these public figures and parliamentarians block initiatives for sexual diversity and propose initiatives detrimental to our sector, no longer ‘from the shadows’ as the Catholic Church traditionally did, but openly, as ministers and elected representatives. Another change is they take to the streets to demonstrate about any controversy over sexual rights, with growing intensity and in greater numbers since 2000. I think it has to do with the formal democratization processes in the region and the methods for expressing social demands, which religious fundamentalists have also joined, and why shouldn’t they? But it means we have to think about other ways of confronting an adversary that no longer operates as the ‘power behind the throne’ but defines itself as a social movement.

JV: What is the religious fundamentalists’ source of resources, power and legitimacy?

AS: The psychological and philosophical sources I’ve mentioned. As to resources, it’s impossible to consider religious fundamentalisms out of the context of the global market. They are highly efficient businesses that operate with the same market logic, selling the same services: identity, certainty, etc. Their clients/parishioners give them material and symbolic resources: directly by donations or buying products, but also indirectly because someone who can speak for millions has political power so, for example, governments fear that progressive measures on sexuality will be unpopular. Of course, religious fundamentalists proclaim their legitimacy comes directly from God, but at times I don’t think even they believe it.

JV: What are some concrete examples of the impacts of religious fundamentalisms on women’s human rights in the context of your work?

AS: One example is the same sex civil unions bill (1151/95) presented in the Brazilian Congress in 1995. It never got out of committee due to the enormous pressure of the Evangelical bloc which had almost 120 representatives at the time. The way the law was halted is interesting in that it shows how complex our societies are and how it is impossible to make linear readings of ‘progress’ or ‘backward movement’. While the law was under all kinds of attack - from public debate to threats against representatives who supported it - different states passed municipal or state laws recognising the rights of same sex couples and judicial decisions were made for inheritance, health insurance and adoption rights for gay and lesbian couples. After legislative elections in 2006, the Evangelical bloc was cut almost in half (due mainly to corruption scandals involving Evangelical representatives according to analysts); but paradoxically, the Brazilian gay movement (LGBT in name yet gay in fact) recently stated that civil unions are no longer a priority. Instead the focus will be on penalizing homophobia as it is more likely to be approved. My reading is that this is a broader triumph for religious fundamentalists, not only in their efforts to limit rights, but also in convincing the movement itself to stop advocating for our rights and, worse, that punitive measures are more acceptable than positive ones. It is a symbolic victory of their world vision in which punishment and suffering hold central positions.

JV: Do you see deeper social or psychological impacts of religious fundamentalisms on women’s human rights?

AS: In the example I gave you can start to see what I consider the most profound impact. In the area of sexual rights, agendas are changed supposedly to ‘better confront’ the adversary, but I fear in reality we are dangerously infected with their viewpoint. Especially in the case of sexual diversity, the movements started in the 1970s speaking about ‘sexual liberation’ emphasising pleasure, discovery, appropriation of the body, and breaking patriarchal moulds. This discourse is now marginalized. As I see it, the current discourse attempts to respond to religious fundamentalists with their own language: “we are a family too,” “God made me homosexual,” emphasising suffering, death and punishment, to make LGBT people ‘acceptable’ subjects for mainstream human rights. The direct consequence of this ‘mental matrimony’ is that we win rights for the most mainstream sectors (middle or upper class monogamous or apparently monogamous gay or lesbian couples with or without children, or trans people who identify with the model of having been born in the wrong body) while those who by their mere presence or political position cannot assimilate to this agenda are increasingly marginalized (bisexuals, trans people identifying with other models, intersex, gays and lesbians whose lifestyles do not fit the above description). A worrisome example is the gender identity bill proposed in March 2007 in Mexico, with the support of trans groups; it explicitly includes requirements like sterilization or divorce in case of previous marriages for the government to recognize the gender identity chosen by the person. You can see how the draft bill makes it ‘palatable’ for a society and government apparatus dominated by Catholic religious fundamentalists, which can only accept trans people as asexualized and sterile ‘errors of nature’.

JV: Do you notice any impacts specific to young women or youth?

AS: Youth are the most coveted sector for businesses, whether they are religious fundamentalists or secular, because they are assumed to be the most easily influenced and manipulated, but also because they embody one of the West’s deepest social aspirations. If a product – whether a sneaker or a church – is associated with youth, it is very likely that adults will consume it too, to feel young. Recently, it has become very important to Catholic and Evangelical churches to define themselves as part of a youth movement because of their increased use of the message that ‘the newest thing’ is a reaction against decadence and licentiousness. And ‘the new thing’ must always be young, so it is not accidental that religious fundamentalists actively seek young spokespeople. At Beijing+5 and Beijing+10 the ‘armies’ of religious fundamentalist reaction were made up of youth. In Buenos Aires religious fundamentalist youth stand in front of the cathedral during the Pride March each year to protect it from attacks by deviants. When speaking of the market’s use and objectification of youth, we must include religious fundamentalisms in that phenomenon.

JV: Who is successfully resisting and challenging religious fundamentalisms in your context, and how? Are there any strategies specifically led by young women?

AS: Basically it’s the movements advocating for sexual diversity in its different compositions, almost always in alliance with feminist and youth movements. Conceptually, the strategy of appropriating human rights discourse by LGBT movements to respond to religious fundamentalist attacks has been critical. Though the counter to this is that we have lost the component of liberation and radicalism from the movement’s earlier years, there is no doubt that adopting the human rights discourse has given enormous legitimacy to the movement’s subjects and demands. It is an argument that, in Latin America, where the idea of human rights is tightly linked to the fight against dictatorships, is not easy to counteract. The strategy has been to present respect for sexual diversity as inalienable from democratic values, pluralism and racial and religious tolerance – all of which has ‘good press’ in the region; and to present religious fundamentalisms as intolerant, aggressive, violent. None that I know of were led specifically by young women. LGBT movements are still very hierarchical and the leadership is generally white, middle aged, gay male professionals. For everyone else, including young women, it is very difficult to hold leadership positions.

JV: What factors most weaken responses to religious fundamentalisms?

AS: The basic irresolvable issue for us is that the essential attraction of religious fundamentalisms is their capacity to provide identity, certainty and quick and seemingly unquestionable definitions and solutions. It is impossible to seriously work on sexuality and offer that. In contrast, all we can offer are uncertainties, risk, multiple possibilities that then add more complexities, and this applies to everything: bodies, identities, practices, desires. Unfortunately such a message is not attractive to many in today’s world. Thus, the strategy now used is to adapt our messages and realities to fit their parameters; codifying and closing off identities, privileging marriage over a vast variety of relationship configurations found within the concept of LGBT. Yet, I feel that responding to religious fundamentalisms in their own terms is to lose the battle; it makes much more sense to position ourselves as a radically different option, although this seems, in principle, an obstacle.

JV: How have religious fundamentalist agendas influenced responses to the HIV/AIDS pandemics and what is the impact on women’s rights?

AS: Churches in the region have unanimously condemned condom use as leading to our sexual downfall, but Latin American societies are characterised by pragmatism. Once the idea that not using condoms could kill you became known, people turned deaf ears to condemnations from the pulpits. Some countries, like Brazil, have played an exemplary role in their unrestricted commitment to fighting HIV/AIDS without prejudice. Even in Mexico with the Right in power it is very difficult to cut HIV/AIDS programs or limit rights (in contrast to what is happening with reproductive health) because of the entrenched societal consensus that protecting lives and health is above any dogma. In some cases, the Church’s indifference to people touched by the epidemic has tainted its image, which is always a good thing.

JV: Is there a relationship between international development aid and religious fundamentalisms, and with what impact on women’s rights if so?

AS: Here the clearest manifestations are conditions on resources granted by the United States, especially from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria; recipient agencies must agree not to deal with sex workers (except to ‘reform them’, an attitude most feminist movements in the region share). The Global Gag Rule is also important, but those working in reproductive rights can speak to that. The attitude of the Brazilian government is admirable; working with LGBT and sex workers’ movements (and opposed by feminists, it’s worth noting), they refused these funds. And again, there is this Latin American pragmatism; many organizations (including a sex workers’ group) signed the commitment with no intent of honouring it, got the funds and kept working as they always had, while, with the skill that characterises us, dissimulating about activities they were not supposed to be undertaking.

JV: Do you know of any particularly innovative or successful initiatives on religious fundamentalisms and women’s human rights?

AS: In Argentina the most successful and innovative one is the Campaign for Legal, Free and Safe Abortion, bringing together many movements, they succeeded in gaining greater social acceptance than ever before for the idea that at least in certain cases (especially rape) abortion should be decriminalized. This campaign has earned the ire of Catholic fundamentalists and is the best example of a successful strategy.